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This paper focuses on the evolution of the institutional 
presidency – meaning the cluster of agencies that directly support 
the chief of the executive – in Argentina and Brazil since their 
redemocratization in the 1980s. It investigates what explains the 
changes that have come about regarding the size of the 
institutional presidency and the types of agency that form it. 
Following the specialized literature, we argue that the growth of 
the institutional presidency is connected to developments 
occurring in the larger political system – that is, to the political 
challenges that the various presidents of the two countries have 
faced. Presidents adjust the format and mandate of the different 
agencies under their authority so as to better manage their 
relations with the political environment. In particular, we argue 
that the type of government (coalition or single-party) has had 
consequences for the structure of the presidency or, in other 
words, that different cabinet structures pose different challenges 
to presidents. This factor has not played a significant role in 
presidency-related studies until now, which have hitherto mostly 
been based on the case of the United States. Our empirical 
references, the presidencies of Argentina and Brazil, typical cases 
of coalitional as well as single-party presidentialism respectively 
allow us to show the impact of the type of government on the 
number and type of presidential agencies. 
 Keywords: Argentina; Brazil; institutional presidency; 
presidential office; coalition presidentialism. 
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residents are undoubtedly the most powerful political actors in Latin 
American democracies. They enjoy significant policy-making powers 
in multiple policy realms as a means to influence the legislative agenda, control the 
allocation of resources, appoint and dismiss thousands of different government 
officials, and respond directly to the demands of their electorate. But even the most 
influential presidents need the political support and technical assistance of trusted 
advisors, technical staff, and government agencies. Students of the United States' 
presidency have shown that presidents have incentives for creating and 
strengthening technical, administrative, and advisory presidential support bodies 
both to confront critical junctures – the modern US presidency emerged in the 
wake of the Great Depression – and to help face the challenges that are posed in a 
system characterized by "separate institutions sharing powers". At the same time, 
scholars have also documented the increasing centralization of authority around 
the person of the chief executive and the steady movement toward the institutional 
reinforcement of the political core executive as developments that have taken 
place in most advanced industrial countries in the last forty to fifty years (PETERS 
et al., 2000). 
In Latin America, the distinction between executive leadership and the 
institutional nature of the modern presidency has not been really addressed yet, 
despite there having been a significant expansion of studies on presidentialism. 
For a long time, a history of democratic and institutional instability drove 
researchers' attention to other crucial topics which were, to a great extent, 
connected to the survival of presidential regimes (LINZ, 1990). However, after 
decades of democratic rule in the region, presidential scholars have become more 
concerned with themes that also interest their US counterparts, such as those 
dealing with managerial issues of governance1.  In this paper, we focus on the 
presidencies of Argentina and Brazil since their redemocratization in the 1980s in 
                                                          
1 In effect, in the last couple of years there has been progress in the field of presidential 
studies in Latin America: some publications have begun to tackle conceptual issues 
(BONVECCHI and SCARTASCINI, 2014; LANZARO, 2012), in conjunction with others 
dealing with case studies (MÉNDEZ, 2007, on the case of Mexico; LANZARO, 2013, on 
Uruguay; COUTINHO, 2008, on Argentina).  Similarly, the recent creation of the Group for 
Executive Studies (GEE), within the framework of the Latin American Association of 
Political Science (ALACIP), indicates an awakening interest in the field. Still, we have not 
identified any comparative effort similar to the one we present in these pages.       
P 
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order to shed light on this underresearched topic. Our study of the presidency 
concentrates on the cluster of agencies that directly support the chief executive; 
this is called the "core executive" (PETERS et al., 2000) or the "institutional 
presidency" (MOE, 1993; 1994) in the presidential studies literature2. These 
agencies are part of the bureaucracy of the executive branch, but they are not 
located within the executive cabinet; their defining characteristic is that they 
operate under the direct authority of the president and are responsible for 
supporting the presidential leadership (DICKINSON, 2005). Following the 
specialized literature, we argue that the growth of the institutional presidency is 
connected to developments occurring in the larger political system – that is, to the 
governmental and political challenges that presidents face (MEZEY, 2013; MOE, 
1985; PONDER, 2012). Presidents adjust the format and mandate of the different 
agencies under their authority so as to better manage their relations with the 
wider political environment. 
We observe reverse developments having taken place after the democratic 
transitions in both Argentina and Brazil, where the institutional presidency has at 
times been expanded and at other times reduced – and we thus inquire into the 
causes of such evolutions. These movements have not only affected the size of the 
institutional presidency but also the types of agencies that form it. Regarding size, 
we borrow from Terry Moe (1985; 1993; 1994), and call any increase in the 
number of presidential agencies "centralization". For Moe, a centralizing 
movement indicates a shifting of the functions of the wider executive branch to the 
core executive; while, conversely, presidents "decentralize" when they take 
agencies away from their direct authority and place them under the authority of a 
cabinet minister. Regarding the types of agencies, making changes to those under 
the presidential umbrella can affect their substantive tasks in terms of providing 
core administrative, policy, or advisory support (INÁCIO, 2012). In the following 
pages, we: analyze the creation, transfer, and/or dissolution of presidential 
agencies; compare how the blueprint of the institutional presidency looks in 
                                                          
2 In this paper we make an indistinct use of the terms "institutional presidency" and 
"presidential office" to refer to the group of agencies located directly under the president's 
authority. Later on we operationalize the term "Institutional Presidency" (IP), which we 
use to refer specifically to all agencies under the president's authority excluding the 
decentralized ones. More details on this are given in Section 3. 
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Argentina and Brazil over time; and, search for the causes of the differences 
between the two cases.     
We argue that the type of executive cabinet – a factor that until now has 
not played a significant role in presidential studies, which are mostly based on the 
US case – poses various challenges to presidents and, thus, impacts differently on 
the structure of the presidency. Our empirical references, the presidencies of 
Argentina and Brazil and typical cases of single-party and coalitional 
presidentialism, respectively, allow us to test the impact of the aforementioned 
factor. In effect, we expect to find greater centralization under coalition 
presidentialism because presidents must share cabinet positions, negotiate, and 
manage relations with coalition partners. In single-party governments, meanwhile, 
presidents can more freely assert themselves over the whole executive structure; 
in other words, centralization should be less necessary. Similarly, we expect the 
type of government to affect the types of agencies that form the institutional 
presidency, with coalition presidents building a more complex and varied 
presidential institution.  
The literature on presidentialism, particularly that which focuses on 
coalition experiences in Latin America, sheds light on the "executive toolbox" that 
is available to the different heads of state for building legislative majorities (RAILE, 
PEREIRA and POWER, 2011). Our analysis highlights a specific tool herein that 
previous studies on this region have not yet explored: the strategic redesign of the 
bureaucratic structures of the presidential office, undertaken by the president. It 
suggests that presidents can use the making of structural changes in their office as 
a tool with which to manage their relations with the wider political environment in 
general, and with the cabinet in particular. These changes are resources that the 
president can use to complement or substitute other tools, such as agenda-setting 
power or pork and ministerial nominations – which are those aspects usually 
highlighted in the aforementioned literature (ALTMAN, 2000; AMORIM NETO, 
2000; FIGUEIREDO and LIMONGI, 1999; MARTINEZ-GALLARDO, 2012).  
The paper is organized as follows: The next section presents the 
theoretical background to our study of the institutional presidency, with emphasis 
on the existing theories about the growth of the US presidency and with references 
to the main features of the Argentine and Brazilian political systems. Next, Section 
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3 deals with the research question, data, methodology, and the results obtained 
from our empirical study. Section 4 then concludes by outlining our pending tasks 
as researchers, and by suggesting the implications of our work for the agenda of 
presidential studies on Latin America henceforth. 
 
State of the Art  
There are three prominent explanations given for the emergence and 
growth of the institutional presidency: increased government responsibilities, the 
reassertion of the presidential leadership vis-à-vis the political environment 
(Congress and the general public), and the more astute management of cabinet 
politics. 
The expansion of the governance capacity of the executive to deal with 
major social and economic challenges is one of the classical explanations given for 
the growth of the US institutional presidency. Beginning in the late nineteenth 
century, but becoming particularly marked in the early twentieth century, the role 
of government both in the US and elsewhere began a steady expansion, with 
increased responsibilities coming therewith. This had a profound effect on the size 
and political role of the executive branch, giving rise to the bureaucratic state. The 
enlargement of the executive branch gave greater prominence and power to the 
president, but also brought about many problems because presidents were now 
expected to manage both all of their old responsibilities and the new challenges as 
well (MEZEY, 2013, pp. 99-103). According to this line of analysis, presidents 
developed incentives for creating and enlarging the technical, administrative, and 
advisory presidential support bodies so as to confront critical challenges (national 
security threats, recessions, popular unrests) and to handle increasing 
responsibilities, such as was the case for President Franklin D. Roosevelt during 
the Great Depression (PELIKAN, 2005, p. XV). Exponents of this thesis are, for 
instance, Ragsdale and Theis (1997), whose model demonstrates that the growth 
of the presidential institution matches more the increase in government 
responsibilities and presidential workload over the course of decades than it does 
individual presidential styles or the political conditions under which they work.  
Ragsdale and Theis (1997) maintain that the rudiments of the US 
presidential institution began in 1924 with the creation of the Bureau of the 
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Budget, although most scholars consider that 1939 marks the completion of the 
institution's formal creation with the founding of the Executive Office of the 
President (EOP), the transfer of the Bureau of the Budget to the EOP, and the 
creation of the White House Office within the EOP. Interestingly, the establishment 
of the EOP was contemporaneous with the beginnings of presidential 
organizations in Argentina and Brazil. In Argentina, these agencies grew 
considerably under the de facto presidency of General Ramirez (beginning in 
1943), who created not only the General Secretariat of the Presidency (with the 
status of a ministry) but also the Secretariat of Labor and Social Security 
(BONIFACIO and SALAS, 1985). The latter was renowned for serving as the 
launching pad for Colonel Juan Domingo Perón's presidential career. In the case of 
Brazil, the strengthening of the federal government took place in the 1930s and the 
presidential organization underwent a remarkable change during these years. In 
addition to the General Consultation Unit, Getulio Vargas' government created the 
Civil and Military Cabinets and the Administrative Department of Public Service 
(DASP), that turned the presidency into a more complex organization. Although the 
changes had been carried out within the restrictions of a dictatorship, this internal 
means of organization was retained by the presidents of the democratic period up 
until 1964. 
A second thesis posits that the predominant explanation for the expansion 
of the institutional presidency is the president's need to influence policymaking. 
The post-Franklin D. Roosevelt expansion is thus portrayed as an attempt to 
mitigate the role of Congress in the appointment, dismissal, and oversight of 
government officials and to reassert strong administrative leadership (HOWELL, 
2003). Terry Moe's take on the "politicized presidency" (1985) shows how 
presidents respond to limited formal authority and increased expectations of 
presidential power by structuring and staffing the bureaucracy in a way that 
makes the different agencies responsive to presidential dictates. Similarly, 
Rudalevige (2002) and Rudalevige and Lewis (2005) have argued that 
centralization under presidential authority is a presidential strategy adopted to 
overcome hostile congressmen and bureaucracies in order to implement new 
policy agendas. There have been many other studies focusing on the impact of the 
president’s political constraints on the institutional presidency. Dickinson (2000) 
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connected the growth of the White House staff to presidential bargaining with 
Congress and to what occurred in the electoral arena. Krause (2002) found that 
changes in EOP expenditures are primarily explained by the institutional rivalry 
between the president and Congress. Dickinson and Lebo (2007) determined that 
it is primarily the White House's staff growth that is affected by presidents' 
evolving political relations, while the advent of "big government" more generally is 
a a better explanation for the growth of the EOP as a whole. 
In Latin America, presidents count on a wide array of powers to improve 
their ability to govern. These strong constitutional prerogatives suggest the 
prevalence, there, of the president's own preferences and leadership style in the 
construction of the presidential institution3. They also suggest that the Latin 
American presidency has a great ability to adapt to changes in the political 
environment (HUNTINGTON, 1968). First, Argentine and Brazilian presidents can 
resort to the use of important constitutional resources to negotiate the policy 
agenda with Congress, such as issuing decrees with the force of law as well as total 
or partial vetoes (SHUGART and CAREY, 1992). Second, while US presidents share 
authority with Congress over the appointment of cabinet members and other 
important government staff, most Latin American presidents only appoint such 
individuals by the signing of an ordinary decree: the organization of the executive 
cabinet and the appointment strategy is the presidential calculus (AMORIM NETO, 
2006). Equally, they do not need congressional authorization to remove 
government officials from their job. Third, the US Congress participates in the 
design and oversight of the most important executive agencies and all important 
social programs; also, government agencies require some sort of congressional 
approval. Although Congress must still approve major structural changes in the 
executive branch, the Latin American situation is looser. These features make us 
                                                          
3 At this point we acknowledge the extensive and rich literature, mostly on the US case, 
dealing with the incumbents rather than with the presidential institution. Classical works 
refer to different aspects of presidential leadership (NEUSTADT, 1960; SKOWRONEK, 
1997), often drawing from behavioural and cognitive psychology (GREENSTEIN, 2009; 
GEORGE AND GEORGE, 1998). The contributions of this area of presidential studies are 
worth stressing, and are also underresearched in Latin Latin America (see MÉNDEZ, 
2013). Our interest, however, is more centred on institutions than leaders. We understand 
that, to overcome idiosyncratic analyses based on individual cases (and even individual 
leaders) and to progress in the field of comparative presidential studies, we need to 
concentrate first on the institutional developments.      
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expect ebbs and flows in the agencies comprising the presidency in these 
countries, rather than a process of institutionalization. However, the Argentine and 
Brazilian presidents also preside over systems characterized by federalism, a 
symmetrical bicameral system, a judiciary with review powers, and multiparty 
systems that impede the reaching of sufficient support for the president in the 
assembly – these are far-reaching systems of constraints that should induce the 
construction of some permanent bases of support for the president within the 
executive architecture.  
Finally, the literature has thus far been silent on the impact of the type of 
executive cabinet, a point on which Argentina and Brazil – as well as many other 
Latin American countries besides – differ. But there are good reasons to expect 
that single-party and multiparty cabinets demand different management skills 
from presidents, and that the political composition of cabinets affects the structure 
of the institutional presidency. In Brazil, an electoral system of proportional 
represention with an open list and no effective national threshold for 
representation in the federal Congress generates a highly fragmented electoral and 
legislative party system (AMES, 2001). As a consequence, all Brazilian democratic 
presidents have been minority presidents – no party since 1990 has controlled 
more than 20 percent of the seats in either the Senate or the Chamber of Deputies. 
In Argentina, Peronist presidents (1989–1999; 2001–the present) ruling during 
most of the democratic era have managed majorities or near-majorities in both 
chambers, although certainly not for the entire duration of their terms. To manage 
their minority status, Brazilian presidents have been running coalition 
governments since the return to democratic rule, except during President Collor's 
tenure (1990–1992)4. In Argentina, there have been technocrats, independents, 
and other party members participating as individuals in the cabinet, but a 
government coalition has only ruled for two years (1999–2001) since 1983. After 
the 2001 crisis that caused President De la Rúa's resignation, two successive 
presidents were elected by Congress to finish his term (Adolfo Rodríguez Saá and 
                                                          
4 Although Collor de Melo appointed politicians of different political parties in his cabinet – 
as many Latin American presidents also do - his government is not considered a 
coalitional government. We, consistent with most of the literature, consider a government 
as coalitional when party leaders are appointed as representative of their parties and with 
the purpose to strengthen presidential support in Congress through their legislative 
contingents.         
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Eduardo Duhalde), the latter with the support of a broad multiparty parliamentary 
– and then also cabinet – coalition.  
Thus, an important difference between Argentina and Brazil seems to be 
the distance between the preferences of the president and those of his cabinet. 
Brazilian presidents appoint ministers from different parties to comply with 
coalition agreements and cannot easily dismiss them without putting the coalition 
itself in danger. When cabinet positions are distributed to fulfill coalition 
agrements, the president's ministers are not his personal trustees – and he or she 
has incentives to grow the bureaucratic structure under his or her direct authority 
so as to coordinate and solve distributional conflicts among cabinet members. In 
contrast, Argentine presidents do not normally adhere to coalition pacts and can 
more freely exercise their appointment and dismissal prerogatives. Certainly, the 
distance between preferences may still be large, concerning the presidential 
relations with other institutions such as Congress and the bureaucracies, but it 
should not be so pronounced as to affect the daily functioning of the cabinet.  
In short, the centralization of agencies and personnel under direct 
presidential authority is a typical mechanism with which presidents have 
responded to developments occuring in the wider political system (PONDER, 
2012). The growth of the institutional presidency has been connected to the need 
to confront critical contextual challenges, increasing government responsibilities, 
and political and institutional uncertainties. We assume that it is also connected to 
the tasks of cabinet management. In the following empirical sections we attempt to 
estimate the relative weights of these different factors for the specific cases of 
Argentina and Brazil.     
 
Data and Methodology 
Contradictory trends of centralization and decentralization occurring over 
time have been intrinsic to the development of the modern presidency in Latin 
America and beyond. Some agencies survive several different administrations and 
become stable components of the presidency; others, instead, are soon abolished 
or– more often – are moved to other areas of the executive branch. Therefore, 
every year agencies of different types and durations coexist under the president’s 
authority (RAGSDALE AND THEIS, 1997). Graph 01 depicts the total number of 
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agencies under presidential authority in Argentina and Brazil per year from 1984 
until 20105. There are two lines for each country in this graph: the dotted line 
indicates the decentralized (autárquicas) units (AU), which are those structurally 
subordinated to the president but with budgetary and administrative autonomy; 
the continuous line shows the units belonging to what, in the legal structures of 
these countries, is called the "central administration" – which we, as noted, refer to 
as the "Institutional Presidency". In effect, for the purpose of this study, we 
operationalize the institutional presidency (henceforth, IP) as the group of 
agencies directly located under the presidential authority and excluding the 
decentralized ones.  
The lines of the IP for both countries show a smaller and more compact 
structure at the beginning of the democratic period. Afterward, there is 
considerable annual variation – but as part of a more general country-specific 
tendency. The Argentine line moves up and down, while in Brazil there is a clear 
upward tendency. This happens also with the lines corresponding to the AU, which 
are comparatively fewer for the Brazilian presidency but also on the increase at 
the end of the period studied. It is clear that, during the first half of the democratic 
period, Argentine presidents tended to "centralize" agencies under their direct 
authority while in the last years they reversed this tendency, undertaking instead a 
process of decentralization. 
The oscillations that Graph 01 illustrates have given way to different 
makeups for the two IPs throughout the years. In the following, we are first 
interested in exploring what factors have affected the size of the IP in the two 
countries and, second, in what types of agencies constitute the IP. This is because, 
as our theoretical framework indicates, changes in the political environment 
should not only alter the size of the IP but its internal features as well. In order to 
address these two questions, we conducted a two-step analysis: First, we 
                                                          
5 To count these for Argentina, we relied on information concerning the national budget. 
According to this approach, a unit was considered to be such when it had a budget 
allocation. However, we also needed to resort to secondary sources because detailed 
budgets have only been available since 1993. Therefore, the graph includes information 
obtained from other authors as well (COUTINHO, 2008; BONIFACIO AND SALAS, 1985), 
particularly for the 1980s. For Brazil, we considered the legal provisions that distinguish 
the units of the presidency as direct administration, which are different from subordinated 
agencies, such as foundations and public companies. 
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estimated the effects of a set of political and contextual variables on the size of the 
IP by means of a regression model that is presented hereafter. Second, we 
undertook an exploratory qualitative analysis of the types of units composing the 
IP. 
 
Graph 01. Number of institutional presidency units and decentralized units of the 
presidency in Argentina and Brazil, 1984–2010 
 
Source: INACIO_LLANOS_DATABASE.  
 
The Size of the Presidencies 
In this section we are interested in the number of organizational units 
belonging to the institutional presidency of a given country for each year, which is 
our dependent variable (prunits in Table 01). The database contains 53 records of 
the number of IP units per annum: there are 27 entries for Argentina and 26 for 
Brazil, respectively. This database includes six Argentine presidents (Alfonsin, 
Menen, De la Rúa, Duhalde, and Kirchner) and four Brazilian ones (Sarney, Collor, 
Cardoso, and Lula). Table 01 also presents the independent variables that we 
expect to have had an impact on the size of the institutional presidency. These are 
related to the three general dimensions that were referred to in Section 02: 
president–cabinet relations (or type of executive cabinet); president–congress 
relations (or the extent of political support); and, the president vis-à-vis the 
public's support. Our assumption about the behavior of these variables is that the 
number of IP units will increase – or the institutional presidency will grow – in 
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response to the constraints of a political environment that can be a potential 
challenge to the presidential leadership. To account for president-cabinet 
relations, we gathered information on the composition of the government. As 
explained previously, we expect coalition governments – and, particularly, a high 
number of parties in the cabinet – to have a positive impact on the size of the 
institutional presidency6. In other words, political fragmentation within the 
cabinet, and its consequent spurring of demands for coordination efforts, should 
encourage the creation of support units under the authority of the chief executive. 
In order to better understand the impact of the internal dynamics of the 
government upon the size of the presidency, we included the variable cabpart (see 
Table 01), which is based on a count of the number of coalition parties that were 
part of the ministerial portfolio.  
 
Table 01. Descriptive statistics – dependent and explanatory  variables 
Variables Obs Mean Std Dev. Min Max 
Prunits (dep. variable) 53  12.3208 4.5942 6 21 
Cabpart  53 2.8868 2.5545 1 9 
Popularity  53 41.4068 20.4088 7 82 
Reform 50  .5472 .1007 .3 .66 
Dummies 
     Resignation  53 .0943 .2951 0 1 
Seats_dum 53  .5472 .5025 0 1 
Source: INACIO_LLANOS_DATABASE. 
 
Interbranch conflicts are one incentive for the expansion of the 
institutional presidency. In the US presidency-related literature, the logic 
underlying this reasoning is the shared power that both branches have to 
authorize structural changes and appointments in the executive branch – which in 
the case of a divided government scenario would give more power to the 
congressional opposition. To be able to implement his or her policy agenda in a 
restrictive political environment, the president may seek to centralize agencies 
under his or her direct control – thus enlarging the size of the institutional 
presidency. Congressional bodies in Latin America have less power over the 
                                                          
6 Although, as we have stated before, presidents can appoint members of different parties 
in the cabinet, the simple presence of partisan ministers does not involve the forming of a 
coalition. We only count parties in the cabinet when their presence involves the formation 
of a government coalition.    
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executive branch than the US congress has, but their approval is still required for 
major structural changes to be made. We included a variable that addresses the 
political support for the government in the legislative arena. We gathered 
information on the proportion of legislative seats controlled by all governing 
parties in the lower house and built a dummy variable indicating whether the 
president is supported by a majority (more than 50 percent of seats) or not 
(seats_dum, the last line in Table 01). The majority status was observed in 33.3 
percent and 76.9 percent of cases in Brazil and Argentina, respectively. We expect 
a majority status to have a negative impact on the size of the institutional 
presidency7.  
In addition to these two main explanatory variables, we include a set of 
political and economic control variables that aim to measure the power of 
presidents in more general terms. First, we considered the president's approval 
rating (popularity), measured as a percentage of positive survey responses 
("great" or "good") in polls about the performance of the president. This variable 
presents the yearly average for such positive approval ratings, and should have a 
negative impact on the presidency's growth: a president doing well would not 
need to expand her support structures. Second, as presidential resignation is not 
an uncommon event in our data – there were five occurrences thereof across 11 
presidential terms – we thus include a dummy variable (resignation) indicating 
whether the president assumed her position in the wake of a previous incumbent's 
resignation. Caretakers will not have incentives to introduce major changes 
because they will try to avoid making disruptive decisions in a context of inherited 
conflict. Finally, alongside the political control variables, we intend to capture the 
impact of economic reforms on the expansion of the institutional presidency by 
means of the Structural Reform Index (SRI), as calculated by Lora (2012). The SRI 
is an average of partial indices in five policy areas: privatization, financial and 
trade liberalization, labor regulation, and tax reforms. The closer the measure is to 
                                                          
7 Certainly, this variable is not able to grasp the different compositions of those majorities 
– particularly the heterogeneous political nature of the large Brazilian ones. Therefore, we 
created a second variable that only includes the seats of the presidential party. The 
presidential party represents, on average, 46 percent of the deputies in Argentina, while 
the presidents in Brazil have been supported by an average of 19.7 percent. However, this 
variable is strongly correlated to seats_dum and cabpart, and we did not include it in the 
regression model. 
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one, the greater the degree of general market reform occurring in that country at 
that time. We expect the reform variable based on the SRI to have a positive effect 
on the size of the institutional presidency, because of the coordination efforts that 
are required to lead these types of reform. 
We fitted population-averaged panel data models by using generalized 
estimating equations (GEE) with a Poisson error and link log. Below, we report the 
estimated relative risks (IRR), standard errors, and levels of statistical significance 
(Table 02). In the final count, we worked with 50 observations because of 
restricted data availability regarding the reform variable (which did not cover the 
years 1984, 1985, and 2010).  
 
Table 02.  Estimated regression coefficients and standard errors  (GEE – Poisson) 
Explanatory variables Relative risks (IRR) 
Majority status (dummy) .8215884* 
 (0.084) 
Cabpart 1.075624*** 
 (0.021) 
Popularity .9981615 
 (0.002) 
Reform 3.213858** 
 1.644 
Resignation .9194901 
 (0.163) 
N 50 
Deviance 45.80 
Source: INACIO_LLANOS_DATABASE. 
Note: The dependent variable is the number of organizational units within the CA in a 
given year. Standard errors are given in parentheses. Coefficient estimates from the GEE 
regression model with poisson error and link log. Significance levels : ∗ : 10%  ∗∗ : 5%  ∗ ∗ 
∗ : 1%. 
 
Our variable cabpart – the number of coalition parties in the cabinet 
(cabpart) – behaves as expected: as the number of parties in the cabinet increases, 
so does the size of the institutional presidency. In other words, the size of the IP 
increases by 7 percent for each party taking a seat in the cabinet (p<0.01). These 
results support our hypothesis about the impact of the type of cabinet on the size 
of the presidency. The second dimension considered was president–congress 
relations, which was measured by the majority status of the government in the 
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lower chamber. Holding a legislative majority decreases the size of the presidency 
by 17 percent, in line with our hypothesis – this effect is statistically significant 
(p<0.10).  
Regarding the contextual variables, presidential popularity represented a 
negative effect – as we hypothesized. It suggests that a popular president has fewer 
incentives to invest time and resources in enlarging the presidency, and that he or 
she probably does not need a large structure of support backing him or her. Also, 
after a presidential resignation, the successor centralizes less power and keeps a 
smaller IP than presidents assuming the position after regular elections. However, 
the effect of both variables is not statistically significant. The relative risks posed 
by economic reforms show us that these types of challenges exert pressure on the 
presidency. An increase of one point in the SRI increases the size of the 
institutional presidency by 221 percent (p<5). Figure 1 summarizes the 
expectations and the actual direction of the effects of the explanatory variables on 
the dependent variable, the annual number of IP units.  
 
Figure 01. Expected and actual sign of estimated coefficients 
Explanatory 
Variables 
Expected sign Actual sign 
 
Sig level 
Cabpart + + *** 
Majority status - - * 
Resignation - -  
Popularity - -  
SRI + + ** 
Source: INACIO_LLANOS_DATABASE. 
Note: Significance levels : ∗ : 10%  ∗∗ : 5%  ∗ ∗ ∗ : 1%.  
 
In sum, presidents respond strategically to these different challenges by 
increasing the size of their offices. Particularly, the presidency grows with the 
increase in the number of parties inside the cabinet – a feature associated with 
coalition presidentialism. This shows that presidents need to enlarge their 
organizational support when their governmental team is internally fragmented. 
However, it also suggests that more parties in the cabinet implies less resources 
for presidential patronage and that the presidential offices may be fulfilling this 
patronage function instead. This is something that needs to be explored more 
carefully. In addition, it is interesting to note that presidents have invested in 
enlarging their organizations in order to implement economic structural reform. 
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This type of reform deepens the tensions within the government because it 
impacts on the supporters of the cabinet's parties. Our findings suggest that 
coalition governments pursuing structural reforms have more incentives to 
centralize functions and resources within the presidency. In the next section, we 
explore the types of agencies that presidents have brought under their authority in 
Argentina and Brazil since the 1980s.  
 
The Weight of the Core Units  
In the last thirty years or so, the presidencies of Argentina and Brazil have 
changed not only in size but also in function. Following Inácio (2012), we classify 
the IP units as core, advisory, and policy ones. The units in charge of managing the 
daily tasks of the presidency –those supporting administrative, legal, and 
institutional tasks – constitute the center or the core of the presidency. The 
presidential advisory system, which is gradually integrated with new councils and 
consultative bodies (technical chambers), addresses policy formulation and 
strategic agendas. The policy units are responsible for formulating and 
implementing specific policies (INÁCIO,2012, p. 09). This functional classification 
of the presidential units allows us to compare the makeup of the two presidencies 
studied here and to tentatively explore whether the type of executive cabinet not 
only impacts on the size but also the type of units that presidents bring under their 
direct authority.    
In the 1980s, the IP was basically constituted by core units in both 
countries (see Graph 02 below, which counts the total number of core units and 
the number of IP units in general). After that decade, the number of core units in 
Argentina remained stable while the size of the whole IP increased up until the end 
of the 1990s. The structure of the institutional presidency has followed a different 
pathway in Brazil. The IP was essentially formed by a small number of core units in 
the beginning, which afterward grew together with the other types of units that 
were created by the Collor and Lula governments. Therefore, the downward and 
upward movements in practice mean that there were substantive changes to the 
internal organization of the presidency. These trends involved the creation, 
reform, transfer, and/or dissolution of units responsible for strengthing the 
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presidential capacities to monitor and formulate policy, as well as increases in the 
presidency's informational resources.  
 
Graph 02. Number of core units and IP units of the presidencies of Argentina and 
Brazil, 1984–2010 
 
Source: INACIO_LLANOS_DATABASE. 
 
Graph 03 depicts the percentage of each type of unit, out of the total of all 
IP units for the whole time period studied, in both countries. The Argentine 
presidency was internally less diversified, with the units oscillating only between 
core and policy ones. We can see in this graph that the process of unit 
centralization taking place in this country in the 1990s mostly concerned policy 
issues. The new policy units did not necessarily cover crucial areas but, rather, 
ones that mattered to the president: drugs, tourism, culture, science and 
technology, and social development. Many of them were abolished or reassigned to 
ministries during the following decade. The lack of advisory units is remarkable, 
although the core units contribute to these tasks in practice. The Brazilian picture 
is more diverse. The monolithic presidency of the 1980s has since been substituted 
by an internally differentiated and specialized institution. While the expansion of 
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policy units has been attributed to specific junctures8, the creation of advisory 
bodies inside the presidency has in fact been a continuous process. The 
strenthening of the core units, by means of investment in organization and 
personnel, has coincided with the improvement of the informational conditions 
available for making presidential decisions. These advisory bodies are now in 
charge of providing specialized subsidies in priority areas.  
Regarding the core units in Argentina, they have in essence included the 
General Secretariat of the Presidency, the presidential unit, the legal and technical 
unit, the communication and press unit, and the Secretariat of Intelligence 
(ALESSANDRO, 2010, p. 25; COUTINHO, 2008) – all units have a long-standing 
presence within the presidency. The General Secretariat endorses all the legal 
decisions of the presidency, while the legal area (Legal and Technical Secretariat) 
provides legal advice to the president, the chief of cabinet, and to the ministers that 
require it; it also analyzes the constitutionality of all legal decisions taken and, in 
general, centralizes all activities related to the legal decisions arrived at by the 
president. The three general, legal, and intelligence secretaries have the status of 
ministers. A similar structure, one with close functions, can be identified within the 
Brazilian presidency as well: the General Secretariat of the Presidency, the Office of 
Military  Affairs, the Office of the Chief of Staff (Casa Civil), the Armed Forces 
General Staff, the General Consultation of the Republic, and the Armed Forces High 
Command Secretariat for Social Communication formed the initial core units in the 
1990s. Following the redesign of the presidency in 1999, which culminated in the 
transfer of military functions to a new ministry, this core has since experienced a 
gradual process of transformation in its structures, alongside the creation of 
specialized units supporting presidential actions in strategic affairs, institutional 
publicity, and internal oversight. 
 
 
                                                          
8 This happened during the first year of Collor's and Lula's mandates. Collor carried this 
expansion out alongside the simultaneous abolition of several ministries, thereby 
centralizing functions and tasks within the presidency. Under the Lula government, 
meanwhile, the centralization of policies within the presidency occurred at the same time 
as the government increased the number of ministries (INÁCIO, 2006; 2012). In particular, 
Lula centralized policy formulation and implementation in new areas, such as human 
rights, the promotion of racial equality, and women's rights. 
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Graph 03. Percentage of core, policy, and advisory units of the presidencies in 
Argentina and Brazil 
 
Source: INACIO_LLANOS_DATABASE. 
 
However, one important difference between the two countries concerns 
the relative weight of the core units in dealing with the functions of coordination 
and management of the respective governments. In Argentina, a couple of 
coordinating and management (media, civil society) subunits today can be 
identified within the institutional presidency; however, the important function of 
political management is not under the president's authority. Instead, the 
Department of the Chief of Cabinet (Jefatura de Gabinete de Ministros), who is a 
figure with the status of a minister – having been adopted in the constitutional 
reform of 1994, is in charge of this. The chief of cabinet's (ChC)'s functions mainly 
concern interministerial coordination, congressional liaison, and the fiscal 
relationship between the nation and the provinces (www.jgm.gov.ar), one reason 
why the ChC has sometimes been referred to as the "coordinator minister". 
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Although, according to the constitution, political responsibility for the general 
administration of the country is reserved for the president (Article 99), it also 
establishes that the ChC is in charge of the general administration, the execution of 
the budget, as well as having other responsibilities that the president could 
theoretically delegate. The ChC and the different ministers are appointed and 
removed by the president, but the ChC is politically responsible to the Congress 
and can be removed by a vote of censure cast by an absolute majority of both 
chambers (Art. 101)9. 
During the last ten years the Jefatura has undergone a complex process of 
institutional differentiation and today is composed of six secretariats covering 
notable activities of political management such as those of Public Communication, 
Cabinet and Administrative Coordination, National Integration and Parliamentary 
Relations. The original idea that the constitutional reformers had, with the 
incorporation of the chief of cabinet, was indeed the decentralization of the 
presidential authority through the creation of a figure holding parliamentary 
responsibility. In practice, the ChC has become a crucial presidential agent – 
particularly for activities related to political management (see also DE LUCA, 2011, 
pp. 45-47). However, different from Brazil, this agency is located outside the 
institutional presidency and all the coordinating agents that belong to it are 
directly subordinated to the ChC, not to the president. This institutional design 
presupposes that there is a perfect understanding between the president and his 
chief of cabinet. 
In contrast, Brazilian presidents directly head all core units – which gives 
them more discretion and flexibility to define how and through which specific 
unit(s) they will manage the cabinet. Abolished under the single-party government 
of Collor, the role of the Casa Civil (the Office of the Chief of Staff) was later 
reintroduced and, since the mid-1990s, has become a major gatekeeper in agenda-
setting processes within the executive branch. It has assumed a central position in 
the selection and review of bill proposals drawn up by the different ministers (and 
their parties). Similarly, it has enlarged its evaluation and coordination functions 
vis-à-vis governing policies as well as its control over any political nominations 
                                                          
9 All ministers, in fact, are capable of being impeached; such an eventuality has never 
happened in Argentine history, though (MOLINELLI, PALANZA and SIN, 1999). 
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requested by ministers (INÁCIO, 2012; PRAÇA et al., 2011). Different 
arrangements have been in place for the political coordination of the cabinet, but 
they have  always been inside the boundaries of the presidential office and enacted 
through its core units. Centralized within the General Secretariat under Cardoso's 
government, this function migrated – and was expanded – to the Casa Civil. 
Afterward, under Lula's government, it was channeled to a new and specialized 
unit: the Secretariat for Institutional Relations. With cabinet management being 
the president's business, the centrality of the core units is a resilient trait across 
coalition governments. Furthermore, despite the expansion of policy and advisory 
units, the core units have maintained their own relative weight within the 
country's institutional presidency. 
The evolution of IP units, commented on above, reveals important trade-
offs between presidential priorities concerning the role of the institutional 
presidency. It is remarkable that single-party governments, as in Argentina and in 
Brazil10, have expanded the presidency by centralizing the management of 
ordinary policies that could have been led by ministries. Under coalition 
governments, presidents seem more selective in their decisions about what should 
be centralized. Because their decisions affect the rewards that coalition members 
receive, coalition presidents are more careful to add new policy units that might 
help reduce the scope of the various ministerial portfolios.  
In short, the size of the institutional presidency does not reveal the whole 
story behind the differences between the presidencies of Argentina and Brazil. The 
focus on size and internal complexity does, however, provide us with a more 
comprehensive impression of the organizational basis underlying presidential 
power in these two countries.  
 
Conclusion 
The main purpose of this study – an assessment of the impact of the type 
of executive cabinet on the institution of the presidency – comprises both a 
                                                          
10 The Collor presidency, the sole episode of non-coalitional government in Brazil during 
the period studied, enacted a deep centralization initiative by abolishing ministries and 
centralizing their functions into the hands of new IP units, alongside the creation of 
secretariats for implementing new policies. Under President Lula's government – the most 
centralized presidency in terms of governing coalitions – innovative policy units for 
dealing with new issues were created, but only for those left relatively uncovered by the 
jurisdictions of the various ministries. 
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hitherto unexplored area of research vis-à-vis Latin America and an interesting 
agenda for the presidential literature in the future. The analysis developed in these 
pages provides important evidence indicating that the type of government – 
coalitional or single-party – matters, for the variations in the architecture of the 
two presidencies of Argentina and Brazil, regarding both their size and functions.  
It has been shown that the development of the successful Brazilian 
coalition presidentialism has been accompanied by a compact but highly functional 
institutional presidency there. To confirm whether such institutional features of 
the presidency are a condition of success in coalition regimes, we would need to 
replicate the study beyond the two cases discussed here. For this, Latin America is 
a rich laboratory both of successful cases, such as Chile and Uruguay, and of 
unsuccessful ones, such as Ecuador. However, we also need to explore in more 
general terms the effects of determinate forms of presidential organization on 
government effectiveness: in Argentina, in the 1990s and in the 2000s, two 
enduring single-party governments were accompanied by different presidential 
organizations and yet both were successful (as represented by a president being 
reelected in each case). It seems that the interaction between presidential agencies 
and the presidential leadership needs to be considered important as well.  
One of the advantages of the study that we have proposed here is that the 
information on presidential agencies allows for the systematic comparative 
treatment of different cases. Other complementary studies may choose to follow, 
for instance, approaches based on analyses of the profile of the agents heading 
these agencies (their professional qualifications, political origin, and closeness to 
the president) as well as comparisons of the size of the presidency in terms of 
employees and budget. However, one limit to conducting such analysis is the 
availability of relevant information across countries and years, a problem that we 
experienced while undertaking this research. A more serious additional obstacle 
for comparative studies is the different level of institutionalization that we found 
in the respective presidencies of the Latin American region. It is foreseeable that, 
in some cases, the important functions that we described in this paper are in the 
hands of individuals, and not of agencies. This problem should not, though, 
discourage further investigations but, rather, direct the focus toward the important 
topic of presidential institutionalization. 
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